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In the mid-1860s, Washington Territory’s entrepreneurial Asa 
Shinn Mercer endeavored to bring hundreds of young women from the 
East Coast to the tiny frontier town of Seattle as prospective brides for 
men who had settled there as fishermen, fur traders, and miners. The 
much-mythologized “Mercer Girls” story was a natural fit for the 
romantic-comedy genre, and was most famously memorialized in the 
1954 musical film Seven Brides for Seven Brothers and the television 
sitcom series of the late 1960s Here Come the Brides. A few popular 
histories have been written about the Mercer Girls, but until now 
their experiences have received little serious attention as a subject of 
legal or historical significance.  
Professor Kerry Abrams’s article The Hidden Dimension of 
Nineteenth-Century Immigration Law has changed that. Likely to the 
surprise of immigration law scholars, Abrams frames her account of 
Asa Mercer’s venture as a story about immigration law history. In so 
doing, she offers us a capacious conception of immigration law’s form 
and function—one that contemplates the many ways that federal, 
state, and territorial law was used in the nineteenth century to 
encourage the production of a particular kind of citizenry.1
 
 ∗  Associate Professor of Law and Peter Paul Development Professor, Boston University . I 
thank Gerry Leonard and Kerry Abrams for comments on an earlier draft of this Response.  
 By 
reconstructing the Mercer Girls’ westward migration as a story about 
immigration law, Abrams acknowledges that she risks anachronism: it 
is not clear that easterners who moved to the western territories in 
 1. Kerry Abrams, The Hidden Dimension of Nineteenth-Century Immigration Law, 62 
VAND. L. REV. 1353, 1356 (2009).  
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2459917 
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the nineteenth century, such as the Mercer Girls, understood 
themselves as “immigrants” in the sense that term is used today.2
The primary goal of this Response is to locate The Hidden 
Dimension within American legal historiography, and particularly 
that branch of American legal historiography traceable to the work of 
Willard Hurst. American legal historians need no introduction to 
Hurst’s intellectual legacy. But I hazard a guess that many readers of 
The Hidden Dimension—a significant number of whom will come to 
Abrams’s article from the field of immigration or citizenship law—will 
lack such background. What is to be gained from such a reading? 
There is certainly no imperative that modern legal scholars writing in 
any field continually pay homage to Hurst.
 
Nevertheless, Abrams’s approach sheds important light on the 
historical record, enabling her to usefully connect ostensibly unrelated 
strands of the law’s operation on the nineteenth-century American 
“frontier.” It is those insights that I focus on in this Response.  
3
However, Abrams has produced an account of the Mercer Girls 
story that is most un-Hurstian in a fundamental respect. Hurst is 
often identified with the Cold War-era consensus school—a group of 
scholars who, in varying degrees, predicated their study of American 
history on the existence of a shared national vision and purpose.
 Indeed, it is a welcome 
sign that, in certain respects, the field of legal history has moved 
beyond many of the concerns that animated Hurst’s important work, 
or has come to see them in a different light. Nevertheless, reading The 
Hidden Dimension in light of Hurst’s intellectual legacy is instructive. 
Hurst and Abrams both analyze the law’s operation on the same 
sociolegal terrain—the nineteenth-century “American frontier”—and 
wrestle with many of the same fundamental questions about law’s 
relationship to society.  
4
 
 2. Id. at 1362.  
 By 
recounting the tale of the Mercer Girls as a story about immigration 
and nation building, Abrams denaturalizes such assumptions. 
Instead, she uncovers a microhistory that speaks volumes regarding 
 3. Hurst is possibly the most celebrated American legal historian, living or dead, if judged 
purely by the number of law review volumes and articles dedicated to his work. For law review 
volumes, see Law & Society in American History: Essays in Honor of J. Willard Hurst, 10 L. & 
SOC’Y REV. 5 (1975); Tributes to James Willard Hurst, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 1123; Engaging Willard 
Hurst: A Symposium, 18 LAW & HIST. REV. 1 (2000). The freestanding articles written 
specifically about or in response to Hurst’s scholarship are too numerous to list. The University 
of Wisconsin Law School, where Hurst was a law professor for his entire academic career, 
maintains a list of such articles on its website. See University of Wisconsin Law School, Works 
about J. Willard Hurst, http://www.law.wisc.edu/ils/works_about_hurst.htm (last visited May 4, 
2010). 
 4. See discussion accompanying infra notes 12 - 18.  
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the law’s role in constituting a white, Christian American citizenry in 
the West—one that included white women as subordinated but 
fundamental participants in that nation-building project. Seen in this 
light, the Mercer Girls story that Abrams excavates is not only a 
chapter in immigration law history; it is also a part of the history of 
law’s colonizing function in the American West. 
I. “INTO A SPACE BEYOND THE BOUNDS OF CIVILIZATION” 
Willard Hurst’s famed monograph, Law and the Conditions of 
Freedom in the Nineteenth-Century United States, famously opens 
with the story of Jason Lothrop and the Pike River Claimants’ Union. 
Lothrop was a settler in Wisconsin Territory in 1836, just after 
Wisconsin became a territory but several years before the federal 
government’s Land Office surveyed the territory for orderly allocation. 
Hurst tells us that Lothrop “set up on a stump a rude press of his own 
construction and with ink which he had made himself printed a 
handbill setting forth the record of the organizational meeting of ‘The 
Pike River Claimants Union . . . for the attainment and security of 
titles to claims on Government lands.’ ”5 In that document, members 
of the union purportedly declared themselves to be “well meaning 
inhabitants” of the territory who had “advance[d] into a space beyond 
the bounds of civilization,” and who now had a shared interest in 
“regulating the manner of making and sustaining claims” on the lands 
they occupied. They further declared their interest in protecting their 
homes and property from “unprincipled and avarice men,” and to that 
end “solemnly pledg[ed] ourselves to render each other our mutual 
assistance in the protection of our just rights.”6
For Hurst, the Pike River Claimants’ Union’s constitution, and 
the circumstances of its production, “reflect[ed] in miniature” 
important aspects of the operation of law in nineteenth-century 
America. One of the central tenets of the Hurstian approach was that, 
in the hands of men like Lothrop, the law was not a force of regulatory 
oppression, as many of his Cold War-era contemporaries contended. 
Responding to the “myth of the Golden Age” of the nineteenth century, 
in which “our ancestors” made do without elaborate regulatory 
regimes, Hurst explained that “legal regulation [or] compulsion” was a 
fundamental part of nineteenth-century society. In a now-famous 
sentence, Hurst declared the importance of law to socioeconomic 
  
 
 5. JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-
CENTURY UNITED STATES 3 (1956). 
 6. Id. at 4.  
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development in the nineteenth century: “Not the jealous limitation of 
the power of the state, but the release of individual creative energy 
was the dominant value.”7
Abandoning the doctrinal, court-focused nature of early 
twentieth-century legal historiography, Hurst radically expanded 
legal historians’ institutional focus. “[T]here is more danger,” he 
observed, “that we shall exaggerate than that we shall underestimate, 
the place of the courts in United States legal history.”
 Men like Lothrop used law to their material 
advantage, and it was that instrumental function of law that 
captivated Hurst’s critical attention.  
8 He insisted 
that the study of legal history should instead encompass “lawmakers” 
in all branches of government—legislative, executive, and judicial. 
Hurst was also interested in understanding the law “as it had 
meaning for workaday people and was shaped by them to their wants 
and vision.”9
In short, Hurst advocated, and developed a program for, the 
sociological study of law in all of its manifestations—federal and local, 
legislative and administrative, in-the-books and on-the-street. Thanks 
to Hurst, legal history came to be viewed as central to the 
understanding of American history more generally.
 This led him to stretch well beyond legal sources 
generated by official legal institutions to include documents like the 
constitution of the Pike River Claimants’ Union.  
10 As Aviam Soifer 
and others rightly insist, “[O]ur basic approach to legal history still 
builds on the background theory initially sketched and then realized 
by Hurst.”11
But not completely so. There has been considerable debate 
concerning whether Hurst was part of the consensus school of 
American history—a group of midcentury historians credited with 
perpetuating the notion that American society was united by values 
and norms widely shared among the population.
 Whether consciously or not, Abrams writes legal history 
in an intellectual world at least partly crafted by Hurst.  
12
 
 7. Id. at 7. 
 One need not 
 8. JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 86 (1950). 
 9. HURST, supra note 5, at 5.  
 10. For example, in the first footnote to her important 1986 book Women and the Law of 
Property in Early America, Marylynn Salmon—writing from an appointment in a history 
department—noted that “the move to study law and social forces together began, of course, 
under the direction of Willard Hurst at the University of Wisconsin Law School.” MARYLYNN 
SALMON, WOMEN AND THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN EARLY AMERICA 195 n.1 (1986).  
 11. Aviam Soifer, Reflections on the 40th Anniversary of Hurst’s Growth of American Law, 
17 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 167, 172 (1992). 
 12. The question of whether Hurst was a consensus historian has generated considerable 
debate. Compare Mark Tushnet, Lumber and the Legal Process, 1972 WIS. L. REV. 114, 118 
(discussing Hurst as a consensus historian), and Carl Landauer, Social Science on a Lawyer’s 
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resolve this debate to recognize that, at the very least on the level of 
rhetoric and style, Hurst’s writing is characterized by his curious and, 
today, distracting use of the pronouns “we” and “our”: “[W]e had no 
hesitancy in making affirmative use of law.”13 “We were concerned 
with protecting private property chiefly for what it could do.”14 “Our 
prime inheritance was a middle-class way of thinking.”15 “We were a 
people going places in a hurry. Men in that frame of mind are not 
likely to be thinking only of the condition of their breaks.”16
As Barbara Welke and others have observed, the conditions of 
“unfreedom” that were the lived reality of the law for many early 
nineteenth-century “workaday people”—especially women and people 
of color—were not central to Hurst’s project.
 As the last 
quotation suggests, Hurst’s legal subjects—those “workaday people” 
who harnessed law’s potential in maximizing “material 
productivity”—were generally men. More precisely, they were white 
men operating to a considerable degree in the condition of freedom.  
17 Women, African 
Americans, Native Americans, and Asian Americans play extremely 
minor roles in his historiographical legal drama.18 On the one hand, 
this is hardly surprising given that Hurst’s formative intellectual 
years were spent in a legal academic culture dominated by white men, 
many of whom were preoccupied with the New Deal and the economic 
disaster that precipitated it.19
 
Bookshelf: Willard Hurst’s Law and the Conditions of Freedom in the Nineteenth-Century 
United States, 18 LAW & HIST. REV. 59, 67 (2000) (“Hurst writes not to illuminate class, racial, 
gender, or other conflict but to depict a shared culture.”), with William Novak, Law, Capitalism, 
and the Liberal State: The Historical Sociology of James Willard Hurst, 18 LAW & HIST. REV. 97, 
109 (2000) (“When Hurst talked about shared values and institutions, he was not talking about 
the absence of conscious and willed contest and struggle . . . .”), and Soifer, supra note 11, at 168 
(challenging the characterization of Hurst as a consensus historian and urging instead that 
“Hurst tells a tale of dissensus”). My goal in this Response is not to resolve this debate. It is 
sufficient for present purposes to recognize the strands of consensus-school rhetoric and 
reasoning that are present in Hurst’s work. 
 On the other hand, the seismic 
sociolegal contests and transformations that occurred over the course 
 13. HURST, supra note 5, at 7. 
 14. Id. at 24. 
 15. Id. at 7. 
 16. Id. at 9. 
 17. Barbara Y. Welke, Willard Hurst and the Archipelago of American Legal 
Historiography, Archipelago, 18 LAW & HIST. REV. 197, 201 (2000); Mary Frances Berry, New 
Directions for the Children of Hurst, 18 LAW & HIST. REV. 177, 178-80 (2000).  
 18. This is not to suggest that Hurst completely ignored such concerns. Nevertheless, Hurst 
did go so far as to suggest that women’s legal rights, as well as the rights of slaves and freedmen, 
were marginal to the central operation of law in the nineteenth century. See Hurst, supra note 5, 
at 29, 97. For a similar observation, see Stephen Diamond, Legal Realism and Historical Method: 
J. Willard Hurst and American Legal History, 77 MICH. L. REV. 784, 786 (1978). 
 19. Welke, supra note 17, at 199-200.  
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of Hurst’s very productive legal academic career included, most 
prominently, the civil rights movement and the women’s rights 
movement. By the 1970s, while Hurst was still actively writing, the 
culture in the academy was rapidly changing. Writing about the 
“frontier” as a world of “unclaimed natural abundance” that men like 
Jason Lothrop harnessed using law’s entrepreneurial potential was 
already dated and suspect.  
II. “BRING A SUITABLE WIFE” 
Abrams also writes about the law’s operation in the 
nineteenth-century American West. And, writing in an intellectual 
tradition shaped not in small part by Hurst, she tells a story that 
illuminates the sometimes invisible ways that law shapes and is 
shaped by social and ideological norms. She mines a historical record 
that would make Hurst proud, dominated as it is by territorial, state, 
and federal legislative reports, newspaper articles, letters, diary 
entries, and contracts. (Judicial opinions constitute a relatively small 
portion of Abrams’s evidence.) She, like Hurst, is sensitive to the law’s 
long shadow, and the myriad ways that law’s power—both regulatory 
and rhetorical—is captured in “workaday” documents.  
If there is one document that reflects in miniature the role of 
law in Abrams’s account of the Mercer Girls story it is Asa Mercer’s 
1864 contract with an unknown number of men in Seattle:  
I, Asa Mercer, of Seattle, Washington Territory, hereby agree to bring a suitable wife, of 
good moral character and reputation from the East to Seattle on or before September 
1865, for each of the parties whose signatures are hereunto attached, they first paying 
me or my agent the sum of three hundred dollars, with which to pay the passage of said 
ladies from the East and to compensate me for my trouble.20
Like the founding document of the Pike River Claimants’ Union, 
Mercer’s contract with the brideless men of Seattle serves as a lens 
into the ways that nineteenth-century Americans attempted to 
harness law’s power in an effort to “realize their creative energy.”
 
21
 
 20. Clarence B. Bagley, “The Mercer Immigration:” Two Cargoes of Maidens for the Sound 
 
And, like Lothrop’s handpress-printed constitution of the Claimants’ 
Union, Mercer’s contract for the delivery of marriageable women “from 
the East to Seattle” is part of a larger project of legal settlement: the 
use of law to “civilize” the frontier. Finally, like Lothrop’s constitution, 
which memorialized the vigilante intentions of a group of settler-
squatters operating at the margin of lawfulness, Mercer’s contract-for-
Country, 5 OR. HIST. SOC’Y Q. 1, 23-24 (1904) (quoted in Abrams, supra note 1, at 1367). 
 21. HURST, supra note 5, at 6. 
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wives also pushed the boundaries of contemporary legal norms. While 
Abrams carefully notes that the trafficking of women would not 
become a subject of criminal proscription for several decades, there 
was certainly some concern that the Mercer Girls were being 
transported to Seattle for less-than-respectable purposes.22
Although Hurst and Abrams both focus on early nineteenth-
century legal entrepreneurs who made “affirmative use of law” to 
create a “new kind of society,” their subjects and their projects part 
company in significant ways. Lothrop and the workaday people who 
were the focus of Hurst’s attention were white men bent on using law 
to exploit natural resources for profit. Mercer was certainly interested 
in maximizing his individual wealth and material well-being through 
opportunistic use of law, but his project capitalized on a set of social 
imperatives and legal regulations that occupied little of Hurst’s 
attention: the sociolegal regulation of women. Hurst considered in 
passing married women’s property acts, women’s suffrage, and the 
laws regulating women’s working conditions,
  
23 but women’s lived 
experience of the law would not figure prominently in the work of 
historians until the 1970s and 1980s. Working largely from academic 
appointments in history departments, historians—including Linda 
Kerber, Nancy Cott, Marylynn Salmon, Joan Hoff Wilson, and Norma 
Basch—brought much needed attention to the legal status of women 
in American history.24
 
 22. Abrams, supra note 1, at 1379.  
 Legal historians writing from appointments in 
law schools soon joined in, and mainstream law reviews slowly began 
publishing articles that focused on the various ways that the law had 
 23. See, e.g., HURST, supra note 5, at 14, 24, 30; HURST, supra note 8, at 186, 238, 255, 358. 
This is not to suggest, however, that Hurst was uninterested in the history of the legal 
regulation of women and women’s rights.  In the mid-1960s, he supervised a LLM thesis on the 
married women’s property acts. See Kay Ellen Thurman, The Married Women’s Property Acts 
(1966) (unpublished LLM Thesis, Univ. of Wisc. School of Law). 
 24. See, e.g., Linda K. Kerber, The Republican Mother-Women and the Enlightenment: An 
American Perspective, 28 AM. Q. 1987 (1976); Nancy F. Cott, Divorce and the Changing Status of 
Women in Eighteenth-Century Massachusetts, 33 WM. & MARY Q. 586 (1976); Norma Basch, 
Invisible Women: The Legal Fiction of Marital Unity in Nineteenth-Century America, 5 FEMINIST 
STUD. 346 (1979); Joan Hoff Wilson, The Legal Status of Women in the Late Nineteenth and Early 
Twentieth Centuries, 6 HUM. RTS. 125 (1977); Marylynn Salmon, The Legal Status of Women in 
Early America: A Reappraisal, 1 LAW & HIST. REV. 129 (1983). This list is illustrative, not 
exhaustive. Certainly historians were writing about law’s role in shaping women’s lives before 
the 1970s, but not with regularity and not always in published form. For example, Elizabeth 
Warbasse’s widely cited pathbreaking PhD dissertation at Radcliffe College, The Changing Legal 
Rights of Married Women 1800-1861 (Radcliffe, 1960), remained unpublished until 1987, when it 
was published in its original typescript format after having become an “underground classic.” 
ELIZABETH BOWLES WARBASSE, THE CHANGING LEGAL RIGHTS OF MARRIED WOMEN, 1800-1861, 
np (1987).  
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regulated women’s lives.25 By the late 1990s, “the woman question” 
had become “the gender question” and had animated an extremely 
fruitful line of legal historical inquiry.26
What this enormous body of scholarship has revealed is not 
just that legal historians of earlier generations missed out on an 
important dimension of the sociological operation of law in nineteenth-
century America. It has also revealed that a full account of the law’s 
role in the boom of material growth and productivity of the nineteenth 
century—that aspect of laws’ regulatory force and potential that 
captured Hurst’s attention—cannot be rendered without 
understanding the sociolegal construction of gender. In this regard, 
recent scholarship—including John Witt on nineteenth-century 
developments in tort law and workmen’s compensation, Barbara 
Welke on gender and railroad regulation, Amy Dru Stanley on the 
marriage contract and contract law more generally, and Reva Siegel 
on married women’s claims to their own earnings—has demonstrated 
the various ways that the sociolegal construction of gender and family 
was not separate from, but rather was integral to, nineteenth-century 
America’s explosive political and economic development.
  
27
Abrams’s account of the Mercer Girls story continues in that 
tradition, demonstrating in concrete ways that the laws and policies 
governing the interstate (and state-to-territory) movement of persons, 
marriage, and marital property were shaped by a perceived need for 
white women’s civilizing influence in the West. Drawing together 
  
 
 25. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman’s Rights Claims Concerning 
Wives’ Household Labor, 1850–1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073 (1994) [hereinafter “Siegel, Home as 
Work”]; Carolyn C. Jones, Dollars and Selves: Women’s Tax Criticism and Resistance in the 
1870s, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 265; Jane E. Larson, “Women Understand So Little, They Call My 
Good Nature ‘Deceit’ ”: A Feminist Rethinking of Seduction, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 374, 381-412 
(1993); Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation 
and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261 (1992); Lea S. VanderVelde, The 
Gendered Origins of the Lumley Doctrine: Binding Men’s Consciences and Women's Fidelity, 101 
YALE L.J. 775 (1992); Richard H. Chused, Married Women's Property Law: 1800–1850, 71 GEO. 
L.J. 1359 (1983).  
 26. See, e.g., Michael Grossberg, Institutionalizing Masculinity: The Law as a Masculine 
Profession, in MEANINGS FOR MANHOOD: CONSTRUCTIONS OF MASCULINITY IN VICTORIAN 
AMERICA (Carnes & Griffin, eds., 1990); Adrienne D. Davis, The Private Law of Race and Sex: An 
Antebellum Perspective, 51 STAN. L. REV. 221 (1999); Ariela R. Dubler, Wifely Behavior: A Legal 
History of Acting Married, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 957 (2000); Rogers M. Smith, “One United 
People”: Second-Class Female Citizenship and the American Quest for Community, 1 YALE J.L. & 
HUMAN. 229 (1989). Again, this list is illustrative, not exhaustive.  
 27. See JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, 
DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW (2004); BARBARA YOUNG WELKE, 
RECASTING AMERICAN LIBERTY: GENDER, RACE, LAW, AND THE RAILROAD REVOLUTION, 1865-1920 
(2001); AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR, MARRIAGE, AND THE 
MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION (1998); Siegel, Home as Work, supra note 25.  
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seemingly unrelated episodes, Abrams shows how Mercer’s 
entrepreneurial effort to bring white women to Seattle was part of a 
larger sociolegal trend. For example, the federal government promoted 
the settlement of white women through two significant mid-
nineteenth-century land-donation statutes, the Donation Land Act 
and the Homestead Act.28 State and territorial woman suffrage laws, 
as well as acts proscribing certain forms of sex discrimination, were 
enacted at least in part to induce white women to move west.29 In 
other words, at least a small portion of the “conditions of freedom” 
that had been granted to white men in the early nineteenth century 
became part of white women’s bundle of rights in the West, at least in 
certain states and territories.30
Abrams’s account of the various ways that the law was used to 
encourage migration to the West is completely consistent with Hurst’s 
insistence that there was nothing “lawless” about the American 
frontier in the nineteenth century.
  
31 Indeed, Abrams’s emphasis on 
“the productive role of law” could be drawn straight from a volume 
penned by Hurst, except that Abrams is concerned not with the law’s 
role facilitating material production but, rather, its role facilitating 
the production and reproduction of a particular kind of citizenry. In 
this regard, the adjective “white” in the foregoing paragraph deserves 
emphasis. Not all women were given access (albeit limited) to 
government allocations of property and suffrage, and not all women 
were targeted as future wives, mothers, and teachers. Abrams 
properly focuses on the law’s role as a tool to encourage white women’s 
westward migration and, in so doing, illuminates the important role of 
race in the immigration story she tells. As Abrams makes very clear, 
Mercer’s entrepreneurial motivations were racially preconditioned. 
Mercer responded to, and capitalized on, the fear among white settlers 
that white men in Seattle were marrying Native American women, 
becoming “Klootchman lovers.”32
 
 28. Abrams, supra note 1, at 1404-05 (discussing the Oregon Donation Act and the 
Homestead Act, both of which required land claimants to be “white”).  
  
 29. Abrams, supra note 1, 1406-07.  
 30. Let there be no confusion here—Abrams makes very clear that the careful regulation 
and limitation of married women’s rights through coverture were alive and well in the West, and 
that the default common-law regime was one of the conditions that made the Mercer Girls 
venture possible. Precisely because the Mercer Girls were understood as “wives”—wives whose 
husbands would be legally liable for their support and for the support of their offspring—they 
need not be excluded through the then standard means of immigrant exclusion. See id. at 1390-
91. 
 31. HURST, supra note 5, at 4.  
 32. Abrams, supra note 1, at 1363, 1391, 1401, 1409-11. 
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Lest one think the story of race in the Mercer Girls story is a 
tale of how the law of contract could be harnessed to further the ends 
of private racial bias and preference, Abrams’s account quickly dispels 
any such misunderstanding by weaving the Mercer Girls story into a 
larger historical narrative concerning the western territories’ quests 
for statehood. In order to qualify for statehood, a territory had to 
demonstrate that its inhabitants were predisposed toward “the 
principles of democracy as exemplified in the American form of 
government.”33 That official policy promoted the proliferation of 
statutes banning interracial marriage,34 while also setting the stage 
for Asa Mercer’s travels east to Massachusetts to recruit white women 
for his westward migration. As with gender, race was not marginal to 
the story of nineteenth-century development of the American West. 
Rather, it was part of the fabric of law that permeated the kinds of 
social and economic enterprises that were the focus of Hurst’s work—a 
point that has been thoroughly illustrated over the last several 
decades by legal historians writing about the experiences of nonwhites 
in America.35
As the foregoing account shows, gender and race are 
intertwined in Abrams’s sociolegal history of the Mercer Girls, and 
they are intertwined in ways that lead us back to Abrams’s central 
organizing themes: immigration and how law was used to create a 
“nation by design.”
  
36 In this respect, The Hidden Dimension is part of 
a body of scholarship focused on the legal history of immigration and 
citizenship in the United States that began to take shape in the 1950s 
and 1960s, and the much more recent body of historiography that 
focuses on the law’s particular role in shaping women’s claims to 
citizenship. Historians have been keenly interested in immigration 
and citizenship for many decades,37
 
 33. Northwest Territory Ordinance of 1787, art. V, in Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50 
(1789) (cited in Abrams, supra note 1, at 1401 n.241).  
 but in the late 1980s the relatively 
 34. Abrams, supra note 1, at 1411-12 (noting that “in all cases but Oregon, an anti-
miscegenation law was passed within three years of obtaining territorial status, often in 
conjunction with the territory’s organic act”).  
 35. See Berry, supra note 17, at 178 (noting that the problem is not simply that Hurst 
overlooked slavery, but that “Hurst could not validly ignore the impact of slavery as an economic 
institution in an analysis of any aspect of the antebellum economy”). Two very recent examples 
of such scholarship are LEA VANDERVELDE, MRS. DRED SCOTT: A LIFE ON SLAVERY’S FRONTIER 
(2009); LINDSAY G. ROBERTSON, CONQUEST BY LAW: HOW THE DISCOVERY OF AMERICA 
DISPOSSESSED INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF THEIR LANDS (2005).  
 36. Abrams, supra note 1, at 1357 (quoting ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG, A NATION BY DESIGN: 
IMMIGRATION POLICY IN THE FASHIONING OF AMERICA (2006)). 
 37. See, e.g., OSCAR HANDLIN, BOSTON’S IMMIGRANTS, 1790–1865: A STUDY IN 
ACCULTURATION (1941); OSCAR HANDLIN, THE NEWCOMERS: NEGROES AND PUERTO RICANS IN A 
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young field of women’s history consciously embraced citizenship as an 
important focus. In 1989, a star-studded cast of historians convened at 
a roundtable discussion to consider new directions for the study of 
gender as a historical phenomenon. In their remarks, both Linda 
Kerber and Nancy Cott noted the importance of the concept of 
citizenship as a framework—legal and rhetorical—through which men 
and women negotiated their relationships with the state in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.38 Soon after that roundtable, 
Kerber and Cott each produced important articles and books 
illuminating the paradoxes of women’s citizenship, and the central 
role of marriage to the production of “the people.”39 In the same 
period, scholars from different disciplines—including, but by no means 
limited to, Candice Bredbenner, Mae Ngai, Rogers Smith, and Martha 
Gardner—made clear that women’s experience as both tools for, and 
as participants in, the creation of a particular kind of American polity 
deserved far more attention than it had received from earlier 
generations of historians.40
What all of these works have illuminated, and what The 
Hidden Dimension further reveals at the level of microhistory, is that 
there may indeed have been a “we” that spanned the temporal arc 
from the nineteenth-century America of which Hurst wrote to mid-
twentieth-century America during which Hurst wrote. However, the 
“we” that shared a common understanding of sociolegal norms and 
values was not an a priori natural or social collective that existed 
separate from law’s ordering principles, as Hurst seemed to intimate. 
Rather, Hurst’s “we” was itself a product of the law in both its 
  
 
CHANGING METROPOLIS (1959); JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN 
NATIVISM, 1860-1925 (1955). 
 38. Linda K. Kerber, et al., Forum: Beyond Roles, Beyond Spheres: Thinking About Gender 
in the Early Republic 46 WM. & MARY Q. 456 (1989) (forum discussion featuring Linda K. Kerber, 
Nancy F. Cott, Robert Gross, Lynn Hunt, Carol Smith-Rosenberg, Christine M. Stansell). 
 39. NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 5 (2000); 
LINDA K. KERBER, NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES: WOMEN AND THE OBLIGATIONS OF 
CITIZENSHIP (1998); Nancy F. Cott, Marriage and Women’s Citizenship in the United States, 
1830-1934, 103 AM. HIST. REV. 1440 (1998); Linda K. Kerber, The Paradox of Women's 
Citizenship in the Early Republic: The Case of Martin v. Massachusetts, 1805, 97 AM. HIST. REV. 
349 (1992).  
 40. CANDICE LEWIS BREDBENNER, A NATIONALITY OF HER OWN: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND 
THE LAW OF CITIZENSHIP (1998); MARTHA GARDNER: THE QUALITIES OF A CITIZEN: WOMEN, 
IMMIGRATION, AND CITIZENSHIP, 1870-1965 (2005); MAE NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL 
ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA (2004); ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: 
CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY (1997); Leti Volpp, Divesting Citizenship: 
On Asian American History and the Loss of Citizenship through Marriage, 53 UCLA L. REV. 405 
(2005). I have also considered some of these issues. See Kristin A. Collins, Note, When Fathers’ 
Rights Were Mothers’ Duties: The Failure of Equal Protection in Miller v. Albright, 109 YALE L.J. 
1669 (2000). 
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entrepreneurial and its regulatory forms. It was a “we” crafted 
through law’s various manifestations—violent, coercive, and 
rhetorical—from the halls of Congress, the Massachusetts state house, 
and the territorial assembly of Washington, to the extemporaneous 
constitutions of associations (like the Pike River Claimants’ Union) 
and the private agreement between Asa Mercer and the brideless men 
of Seattle. That “we” also engaged in other activities—lawful and at 
least nominally unlawful—intended to shape the population of the 
western states and territories by relocating, exploiting, and 
exterminating existing populations and by importing nonwhites to 
serve as laborers and prostitutes.  
Viewed from this perspective, one can see that by retelling the 
story of the Mercer Girls as a tale about immigration and immigration 
law, Abrams also reveals it to be a story about continental expansion 
and the colonization of the American West.41 This dual valence of the 
Mercer Girls venture was cheerfully captured in an 1865 New York 
Times headline: “Female Emigration: Women Colonizing the Far 
West.”42 This is the stuff of romantic comedy, to be sure. But there is 
also a tragic storyline that winds through Abrams’s account of the 
Mercer Girls. The Hidden Dimension is chock-full of evidence of the 
law’s colonial aspirations and operations in the nineteenth-century 
American West—the ways in which the law was used to bring vast 
geographical spaces inhabited by nonwhite others under the control of 
the United States government, and to create a racialized sociolegal 
hierarchy among the different groups residing there.43
 
 41. An enormous body of legal scholarship focuses on law and colonialism. See, e.g., Sally 
Engle Merry, Law and Colonialism, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 889 (1991) (reviewing several books 
excavating the role of law in colonial regimes). Much of the original law and colonialism 
scholarship focused on colonialism in Africa, the Middle East and Asia. See Jeffrey R. Dudas, 
Law at the American Frontier, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 859, 861 (2004) (reviewing Douglas C. 
Harris, FISH, LAW, & COLONIALISM: THE LEGAL CAPTURE OF SALMON IN BRITISH COLUMBIA 
(2001)). A more recent wave of law and colonialism scholarship recognizes the history of North 
American settlement and westward expansion as fundamentally a colonial enterprise. See 
Christopher Tomlins, The Many Legalities of Colonization: A Manifesto of Destiny for Early 
American Legal History, in THE MANY LEGALITIES OF EARLY AMERICA 1 (Tomlins & Mann, eds., 
2001); Dudas, supra; Christopher Tomlins, American Legal History in Retrospect and Prospect: 
Reflections on the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of Morton Horwitz’s Transformation of American 
Law, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1135 (2003); Christopher Tomlins, The Legal Cartography of 
Colonization, the Legal Polyphony of Settlement: English Intrusions on the American Mainland 
in the Seventeenth Century, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 315 (2001).  
 Thus, the 
federal government privileged whites in the allocation of enormous 
 42. N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1865, at 8 (cited in Abrams, supra note 1, at 1360 n.18).  
 43. There is no single description of law’s role in colonial regimes. However, most law and 
colonialism scholarship is intent on demonstrating, at base, that law was a means by which 
“European colonizers exerted control over Native peoples and their resources.” See Dudas, supra 
note 41, at 862.  
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quantities of land for settlement.44 Interracial marriage was simply 
banned in many jurisdictions.45 Elsewhere, intestacy law was used to 
invalidate, or at least limit the legal significance of, marriages 
between whites and nonwhites by cutting off the inheritance rights of 
children of such unions.46 The law was used to require cultural and, to 
a certain extent, religious homogeneity within the new territories and 
states. New Mexico’s statehood was conditioned on the banning of 
Catholic-controlled public schools and the use of English as the 
language of instruction. Similarly, Utah’s statehood was conditioned 
on the outlawing of polygamy.47
Of course, it was not just the instrumental operation of the law 
in the western territories that implicated law in a colonial project. 
Legal historians and anthropologists who have focused on law’s 
operation in colonial settings, including North America, have rightly 
noted that colonial law not only allocated property and privilege in a 
race-based manner and mandated cultural and linguistic conformity; 
law also helped constitute relations between and among different 
groups living in colonial societies.
 In short, the project of colonization 
was effected through laws that organized the distribution of land to 
privilege white settlers, endowed white settlers with disproportionate 
governing power (while also requiring cultural-religious homogeneity), 
and relegated nonwhites to a second-class status, or far worse.  
48 Anglo-American legal rules and 
discourse simultaneously authorized and gave meaning to particular, 
hierarchical relations between and among whites and nonwhites—and 
men and women—in the nineteenth-century American West.49
 
 44. Abrams, supra note 1, at 1403.  
 The 
resulting colonial legal consciousness provided the circumstances 
under which men like Mercer and Lothrop could and would harness 
the law’s power in an effort to further the expansionist process for 
private gain. Mercer and Lothrop used phrases like “a space beyond 
the bounds of civilization” and “bring a suitable wife” in legal (or 
quasilegal) documents with the expectation that their import was 
readily apparent to other participants in the colonial project, 
 45. Id. at 1412. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 1402.  
 48. This point is made repeatedly in the law and colonialism literature, and with far greater 
nuance than can be accomplished in this short Response. See, e.g., Merry, supra note 41, at 892; 
John L. Comaroff, Colonialism, Culture, and the Law:  A Foreword, 26 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 305, 
309 (2001); Dudas, supra note 41, at 864. 
 49. I focus here on the role of law in North American westward expansion because that is 
Abrams’s focus, but the same can be—and has been—said of the role of law in the colonization of 
the eastern seaboard in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. See Tomlins, The Legal 
Cartography of Colonization, supra note 41.  
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including, of course, the Mercer Girls themselves.50
 
 50. I am by no means the first to observe the intonations of colonialism in the constitution 
of the Lathrop’s Pike River Claimants’ Union. See Tomlins, American Legal History, supra note 
41, at 1143; Tomlins, The Many Legalities, supra note 41, at 7-8, 15-17. Notably, at least some of 
the women who took part in Mercer’s westward migration recorded their approval of the voyage 
as part of an expansionist project. See Abrams, supra note 1, at 1399.  
 In this regard, 
Abrams builds on and contributes to a robust body of legal 
historiography that has revealed the “we” of Hurst’s frontier as at 
least in part the product of law’s colonizing force.  
